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INTRODUCTION 
The effects of climate change on the world’s cities and the people who 
live in them are not subjects that have received a great deal of attention, at 
least not in isolation from other climate change effects.  Climate change ef-
fects tend to get considered in continental or regional terms: melting ice 
caps, agricultural crop losses across vast swaths of land, and shoreline loss 
that will inundate sub-continents.1  Alternately, the discussion tends to fo-
cus on behavioral change, again at the level of entire national populations, 
suggesting that countries must consider using cleaner energy sources, pro-
ducing cleaner-burning vehicles, and providing incentives for citizens to 
insulate their homes better.2  Many, if not most, commentators seem to en-
dorse the view that resolution of climate change challenges should be ad-
dressed at the global level and enforced by state parties pursuant to global 
accords.3  More recently, there has been some discussion of the inequalities 
that climate change will exacerbate.  Crudely put, the analysis posits that 
poorer nations, especially those in Asia and Africa, will become poorer, 
 
 1. See, e.g., David B. Lobell et al., Prioritizing Climate Change Adaptation Needs For 
Food Security in 2030, 319 SCIENCE 607, 607–10 (2008) (noting agricultural crop losses in 
Southern Africa and South Asia); Mark Stallworthy, Sustainability, Coastal Erosion and 
Climate Change:  An Environmental Justice Analysis, 18 J. ENVTL. L. 357, 357-58 (2006) 
(noting shoreline loss on the Indian subcontinent, the Nile Delta, and islands in the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans); Deborah Zabarenko, Arctic Ice Cap Melting 30 Years Ahead of Fore-
cast, REUTERS NEWS, May 1, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSN01 
22477020070501. 
 2. See, e.g., Daniel Roth, Driven:  Shai Agassi’s Audacious Plan to Put Electric Cars 
on the Road, WIRED, Aug. 18, 2008, at 118, 124-25 (discussing the collaboration between 
Project Better Place, Israel, and Renault-Nissan to build electric vehicles and use Israel as a 
test-bed for deployment); Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Seeks Cleaner Energy New Solar 
and Tidal Power Plants Will Be World’s Largest, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 10, 2007, at 11 
(noting South Korea’s aim to increase its use of renewable energy to 10% from the current 
2.28% by 2020); MASS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, GREENHOUSE GASES AND CLI-
MATE CHANGE:  WHAT CAN YOU DO?, http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/climate/ (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers:  The Vices and Virtues of Climate 
Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2008); Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral 
Climate Change Mitigation, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 373 (2007); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Glob-
ally, Act Globally:  The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007); 
Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Cap-
ita Basis? 1 (U. Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 206, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1105205 (beginning with the observation that “[m]any people believe that the 
problem of climate change would be best handled by an international agreement that in-
cludes a system of cap and trade.”).  See generally RICHARD STEWART & JONATHAN WIENER, 
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY:  BEYOND KYOTO (2003). 
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while the richer nations will—if they do not become richer—suffer fewer 
of the negative consequences of climate change.4  In light of these differen-
tial climate change effects on poorer nations, some analysts have explored 
the probability of increased civil strife.  However, even when the literature 
examines effects of climate change on civil strife, the analysis tends to ad-
dress national roles and bilateral or multilateral national responses.5  Fur-
thermore, when land use changes are discussed, urban land use is typically 
excluded from consideration.  The focus tends to be on deforestation and 
agricultural land.6 
This debate strikingly neglects what is arguably the dominant demo-
graphic shift of our era, namely the global trend towards urbanization—the 
move to mega-cities.  As the United Nations Population Fund reports, in 
2008, a majority of the world’s population will live in urban areas.  That 
number is expected to increase by another 50% by 2030.7  In historical 
 
 4. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations:  Further Reflec-
tions on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1589-91 (2007) (indicating that 
global warming will have a disproportionate impact on low-income, unindustrialized na-
tions); Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. 
L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
984266 (exploring application of human rights principles to guide climate change policy); 
Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate 
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1682-
83 (2008) (noting that poorer nations are likely to be the biggest losers due to climate 
change and the wealthier nations are less vulnerable and better able mitigate any negative 
consequences); R. Ramachandran, Burden of the Poor, FRONTLINE, Mar. 9, 2007, at 31, 
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2404/stories/20070309003303100.htm (de-
tailing an interview with Dr. Saleemul Huq on the disproportionate impact of climate 
change on the poor and developing countries). 
 5. E.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 
1 (2007) (noting multilateral options to address climate change); Sanford E. Gaines, Sus-
tainable Development and National Security, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
321, 364 (2006) (discussing implications of greenhouse emissions and climate change on 
global security, particularly in causing floods, storms, and droughts in poor countries); 
Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Ecology and Violence:  The Environmental Dimen-
sions of War, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243 (2004) (analyzing the role of the environment and 
competition over limited resources in war).  A notable exception is U.N. POPULATION FUND, 
STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2007:  UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH 58-
59 (2007) [hereinafter STATE OF WORLD POPULATION].  Even then, however, the urban 
analysis constitutes one and a half pages in a 108-page report.  The full report is available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/presskit/pdf/sowp2007_eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 6. E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & 
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., IPCC SPECIAL REPORT:  LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, 
AND FORESTRY SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pdf/special-reports/spm/srl-en.pdf. 
 7. STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, supra note 5, at 1 (“For the first time in history, 
more than half its human population, 3.3 billion people, will be living in urban areas.  By 
2030, this is expected to swell to almost 5 billion.”).  STATE OF WORLD POPULATION does 
not use a uniform definition for “urban areas” but explains that uses this term to refer to the 
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terms, it is impossible to understate the significance of this phenomenon, 
especially inasmuch as the vast majority of these urban immigrants will ar-
rive with few resources and live in slum conditions.8  Moreover, perhaps 
the characteristic feature of many such slums is that they are dominated by 
the informal economy, characterized by oppressive systems of patronage, 
corruption, and violence.9  As the world gets hotter, this seems likely to 
create a—perhaps literally—combustible situation.10  A host of factors, in-
cluding environmental degradation, inadequate provision of environmental 
and infrastructure services, and limited employment opportunities are com-
bining to turn many of the world’s mega-slums into dangerous, violent 
places.11  Moreover, there is considerable literature that has examined the 
relationship between increased urban violence and temperature rise.12  It 
 
definitions adopted by state statistical agencies, see STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION, su-
pra note 5, at 6; see also Daniel Howden, Planet of the Slums:  UN Warns Urban Popula-
tions Set to Double, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 27, 2007 (writing about U.N. report finding 
that many new urbanites will be poor and live in slums). 
 8. STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, supra note 5, at 1 (“[T]he next few decades will see 
an unprecedented scale of urban growth in the developing world.  This will be particularly 
notable in Africa and Asia where the urban population will double between 2000 and 2030 . 
. . .  By 2030, the towns and cities of the developing world will make up 80 per cent of ur-
ban humanity.”); see, e.g., CARLOS WALTER PORTO-GONÇALVES, A GLOBALIZAÇÃO DA 
NATUREZA E A NATUREZA DA GLOBALIZAÇÃO [GLOBALIZATION OF NATURE AND THE NATURE 
OF GLOBALIZATION] 185-91 (2006) (reporting that 76% of the world’s population live in 
slum conditions—53 million of them, according to the U.N., in the “First World”—and that 
83% of the world’s urban population live in “precarious” conditions). 
 9. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 185 (2006). 
 10. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND:  
FEELING THE HEAT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
feeling_the_heat/items/2917.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (“The average temperature of 
the earth's surface has risen by 0.74 degrees C since the late 1800s.  It is expected to in-
crease by another 1.8° C to 4° C by the year 2100—a rapid and profound change—should 
the necessary action not be taken.  Even if the minimum predicted increase takes place, it 
will be larger than any century-long trend in the last 10,000 years.”). 
 11. A prominent researcher exploring the relationship between environmental scarcity, 
environmental crises, and violence is the Canadian social scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon.  
Although his work does not address climate change specifically, it does explore the relation-
ship of environmental pressures and violence, including urban violence.  See, e.g., THOMAS 
F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 155-68 (1999) (studying urban 
growth and violence); VALERIE PERCIVAL & THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, The Case of South Af-
rica, in ECO-VIOLENCE:  LINKS AMONG ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, AND SECURITY 109, 
122-36 (Thomas Homer-Dixon & Jessica Blitt eds., 1998) (studying the same for South Af-
rican cities specifically). 
 12. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Hot Temperatures, Hostile Affect, Hostile Cogni-
tion, and Arousal:  Tests of a General Model of Affective Aggression, 21 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 434, 434-48 (1995) (reporting results of two experiments examining 
hot temperature effects on aggression while playing video games and engaging in aerobic 
exercise; concluding that a direct relationship exists between hot temperatures and aggres-
sion); Craig A. Anderson et al., Hot Years and Serious Deadly Assault:  Empirical Tests of 
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does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to posit a connection between cli-
mate change and urban violence, one that calls for attention to the role of 
cities in resolving the adverse effects of climate change.  This Article does 
not (because it cannot) presume to establish as an empirical matter that 
climate change is a cause of urban violence.  Rather, the connection be-
tween urban violence and climate change provides the point of departure 
for this Article.  That is, in light of the empirical work establishing a con-
nection between urban violence and both environmental scarcity and tem-
perature rise, this Article proceeds on the assumption that as an environ-
mental pressure (perhaps the greatest environmental pressure), climate 
change can only exacerbate these phenomena. 
In light of this connection and its serious social and economic conse-
quences, this Article seeks, therefore, to begin to define a role for cities and 
their inhabitants in climate change governance.  Part I argues that if we fail 
to take into account global urbanization and its defining characteristics, 
namely extreme squalor and associated social ills, as a central feature of 
climate change policy, we face, as a Rio de Janeiro taxi driver said to me 
during the hot, dry, violent winter of 2006 in that city,13 “um futuro ban-
dido,” literally “a bandit future.”  That is, we face a future where cities, the 
places where most of the world’s population lives, will experience sus-
tained and perhaps intractable urban violence and social disintegration, a 
development that can only hasten the separate but related harms caused by 
 
the Heat Hypothesis, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213 (1997) (reporting results of 
two studies looking at the relation between annual average temperature and crime rate in the 
years 1950-1995 and concluding that there is a direct link); Craig A. Anderson, Tempera-
ture and Aggression:  The Ubiquitous Effects of Heat on Occurence of Human Violence, 
106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 74 (1989) (reviewing relevant studies, violent crime, and domestic 
crime while taking into account geographic regions, seasons, and monthly variations; con-
cluding that there is a direct link between heat and aggression); James Rotton & Ellen G. 
Cohn, Global Warming and U.S. Crime Rates:  An Application of Routine Activity Theory, 
35 ENV’T &  BEHAV. 802 (2003) (finding that, for the period 1950-1999 in the United States, 
“annual temperatures were associated with assault but not murder rates in analyses that con-
trolled for yearly population, ethnicity, and three economic variables”).  But see, e.g., Mi-
chelle L. Bell et al., Vulnerability to Heat-Related Mortality in Latin America:  A Case-
Crossover Study in São Paulo, Brazil, Santiago, Chile and Mexico City, Mexico, 37 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 796 (2008), available at http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/dyn094 
(noting in passing the likelihood that climate change will exacerbate heat-related morbidity 
and mortality); Vania Ceccato, Homicide in São Paulo, Brazil:  Assessing Spatial-temporal 
and Weather Variations, 25 J. ENV’T PSYCHOL. 307 (2005) (finding stronger homicide-
temporal than homicide-climate correlation). 
 13. See Henry Chu, Rio Struggles to Contain Violence on the Eve of 
the Tourism Season, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A3 (noting that “[w]ith every summer 
comes a spike in crimes against visitors” in Rio de Janeiro); Larry Rohter, 19 Are Killed as 
Drug Gangs Conduct Attacks in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at A4 (reporting on the 
wave of violence in Rio de Janeiro that coincided with the start of the summer tourist sea-
son). 
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climate change on the world’s human and biological populations.  Part I 
also explains that the term “cities” does not refer only—or even primar-
ily—to elected or appointed municipal governments.  Rather, Part I en-
dorses an expansive understanding of cities to include both metropolitan 
areas on the official grid and also the shantytowns and slums, the expansive 
informal and extra-legal settlements that define urban living for millions 
the world over. 
Part II explores some of the consequences of the inattention of the cli-
mate change literature, and especially the mainstream U.S.-based legal 
scholarship on climate change, to incorporate a voice for the world’s mega-
cities and their extensive mega-slums in climate change governance.  In 
particular, Part II argues that the failure to incorporate a voice for cities re-
inforces existing and seemingly intractable divisions in international efforts 
to resolve climate change.  Thus, elites with carbon-consumptive behaviors 
in “developing” countries can hide behind their nations’ demands for re-
ductions in “developed” countries, while, conversely, responsible actors in 
“developed” countries get grouped together with the carbon-consumptive 
habits of their economic betters.  Part II therefore suggests that the presence 
of voices representing urban populations would help reveal some of the 
self-interest on all sides and redirect climate change law and policy towards 
the implementation of more equitable solutions. 
Part III then outlines some of the normative advantages of city-inclusive 
governance in the context of climate change regulation.  Part III thus sug-
gests how incorporating voices from cities in climate change governance 
will serve the larger goals of climate change regulation, including emis-
sions reductions strategies and particularly the goal of adaptive manage-
ment. 
Finally, Part IV outlines possible solutions to address the concerns ad-
dressed in the previous parts, suggesting ways in which climate change de-
bate and the search for legal solutions to help combat the phenomenon 
might take account of global urbanization.  Specifically, Part IV suggests 
ways in which a voice for cities, and in particular those urban residents 
usually without voices—in local or national, much less international fo-
rums—may be heard, and their views taken into account in reversing the 
negative effects of climate change. 
I.  CITIES, SHANTYTOWNS, AND EXTRA-LEGAL SETTLEMENTS 
This Part seeks to establish the value of cities, or portions of them, as ac-
tors in the resolution of global climate change problems.  First and most 
evidently, cities merit such a role because of their established strengths as 
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centers of innovation and wealth.14  Cities are also, however, centers of 
inequality:  it is this feature of modern cities that may be as important to 
addressing climate change as their more positive aspects, given that in real-
ity poor urban areas are anticipated disproportionately to suffer the effects 
of global warming and associated ills.15  It may also be observed that city 
residents are especially concerned with climate change, in light of the diz-
zying profusion of local initiatives to address climate change.16  Yet, oddly, 
 
 14. Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitu-
tion, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1102-06 (2008) (acknowledging that cities are a key element of 
innovation and noting that urban areas generate the bulk of economic wealth in the United 
States). 
 15. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6. 
 16. Kevin Doran & Alaine Ginnochio, United States Climate Policy:  Using Market 
Based Strategies to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. 
& POL'Y J. 31, 52 (2008) (identifying “dizzying profusion” of local initiatives, assumed to 
occur because of a lack of federal action); David M. Driesen, The Changing Climate for 
United States Law, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 1, 36-41 (2007).  A good summary of 
state-level programs is Pace Law Sch. Ctr. for Envtl. Legal Studies, The State Response to 
Climate Change:  50 State Survey, in MICHAEL B. GERRARD, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
U.S. LAW 371 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/abapubs/globalclimate/docs/ 
stateupdate_1207.pdf.  For examples of local climate change initiatives see California 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 
2008) (combining regulatory and marketplace mechanisms in an attempt to reduce the 
state's greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020); City Council of Austin, Res. No. 
20070215-023 (Tex. 2007), available at  http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/acpp/downloads/acpp 
_res021507.pdf (resolving that climate change is a serious threat and creating a five-part 
plan, The Austin Climate Protection Plan, that seeks to reduce and reverse the negative im-
pacts of global warming); GREATER LONDON AUTH., ACTION TODAY TO PROTECT TOMOR-
ROW:  THE MAYOR'S CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2007), http://www.london.gov.uk/ 
mayor/environment/climate-change/docs/ccap_fullreport.pdf (noting London’s plan to cut 
and maintain emissions at 60% below 1990 levels by 2025); S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T & S.F. 
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN FOR SAN FRANCISCO:  LOCAL ACTIONS TO RE-
DUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2004),  http://www.sfenvironment.org/downloads/ 
library/climateactionplan.pdf (noting San Francisco’s plan to reduce overall greenhouse gas 
emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2012); MAYOR’S GREENPRINT DENVER ADVISORY 
COUNCIL, CITY OF DENVER CLIMATE ACTION PLAN:  FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR 
HICKENLOOPER (2007), http://www.greenprintdenver.org/docs/DenverClimateActionPlan. 
pdf (outlining ten recommendations that are projected to achieve Denver’s 2012 goal of re-
ducing per capita greenhouse gas emissions by 10% below 1990 levels); CITY OF ASPEN CA-
NARY INITIATIVE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2007-2009 (2007), http://www.canaryinitiative. 
com/pdf/CAP.pdf (outlining Aspen’s goals for addressing global warming and how they can 
be achieved; the Plan is also meant to act as a mechanism to monitor progress and as a guid-
ing document for all policies developed within the City); CITY OF L.A., GREEN LA:  AN 
ACTION PLAN TO LEAD THE NATION IN FIGHTING GLOBAL WARMING (2007), http:// 
www.lacity.org/ead/EADWeb-AQD/GreenLA_CAP_2007.pdf (laying out Los Angeles’s 
plan to reduce CO2 emissions 35% below 1990 levels by 2030); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAY-
ORS, THE U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT (2005), http://www.usmayors. 
org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (describing a voluntary agreement 
signed by over 880 U.S. mayors in which participating cities agree to take the following ac-
tions:  meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol targets in their own communities; urge their state 
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in the United States, the federal government appears to object to this phe-
nomenon; attempts are underway to silence local efforts to respond to cli-
mate change, even in the face of federal inaction.17 
A. The Neglect of Cities 
The neglect of cities in international climate change debates and, in par-
ticular, in U.S. legal scholarship addressing climate change is not entirely 
surprising.  As Gerald Frug noted in a classic piece nearly three decades 
ago, cities have largely been rendered powerless in U.S. legal discourse and 
practice.  Frug noted the paradox that our “highly urbanized country has 
chosen to have powerless cities, and that this choice has largely been made 
through legal doctrine.”18  Frug further noted another paradoxical devel-
opment: “Not only are cities unable to exercise general governmental 
 
governments, and the federal government, to enact policies and programs to meet or beat 
Kyoto Protocol targets suggested for the U.S.; and urge the U.S. Congress to establish a na-
tional emission trading system); CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC:  A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK 
(2007), http://home2.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/full_report.pdf (containing, 
in part, New York City’s plan to reduce global warming emissions by more than 30%); TO-
RONTO ENERGY EFFICIENCY OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN AIR AND SUSTAINABLE EN-
ERGY ACTION PLAN:  MOVING FROM FRAMEWORK TO ACTION, PHASE 1 (2007), 
http://www.toronto.ca/changeisintheair/pdf/clean_air_action_plan.pdf (containing Toronto’s 
reduction targets for greenhouse gases from the 1990 levels of 6% by 2012, 30% by 2020, 
and 80% by 2050); see also Matthew Garrahan, Antonio Villaraigosa:  Mayor Sets Agenda 
for the Nation, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/906430ac-a3b5-
11dd-942c-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1 (documenting the desire of Los Angeles 
Mayor Villaraigosa to make L.A. “the greenest city in the nation”).  Developing countries 
are also beginning to articulate climate change responses, as is the case, for example, with 
Mexico City.  See PROGRAMA DE ACCIÓN CLIMÁTICA DE LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO 2008-2012 
(2008) (copy on file with author).  In addition, although a national rather than local initia-
tive, the INDIAN  PRIME MINISTER’S COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE:  GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, http://pmindia.nic.in/Pg01-52.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2008) merits attention for its focus on urban effects of climate change and poli-
cies appropriate to address them. 
 17. See, e.g., Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Climate Change:  House Energy Chairman Re-
leases Draft Bill That Would Preempt State Climate Actions, DAILY ENV’T REP., Oct. 8, 
2008, at A-11; Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Outlook for Capping U.S. Emissions in 2009 May 
Hinge on Depth of Economic Upheaval, DAILY ENV’T REP., Oct. 2, 2008, at B-3; Arnold 
Schwarzenegger & Jodi Rell, Op-Ed., Lead or Step Aside, EPA:  States Can't Wait on 
Global Warming, WASH. POST, May 21, 2007, at A13 (criticizing the EPA’s refusal to allow 
twelve states to enact tougher tailpipe emissions standards).  Despite congressional efforts to 
the contrary, however, federal regulators have begun to show signs of accepting local gov-
ernment efforts as a productive route of climate change action.  See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, 
EPA Regions Using Existing Programs to Help Industry, Governments Cut Emissions, 
DAILY ENV’T REP., Sept. 8, 2008, at A-1. 
 18. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 
(1980). 
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power, but they also cannot exercise the economic power of private corpo-
rations.”19 
In the context of global climate change debates, Frug’s observation is in-
structive: in climate change, corporate interests are among those recognized 
as having a stake in resolving the problem, while cities are not.  The corpo-
rate interest is often included because it is modified by the adjective “mul-
tinational,” as if the mere fact of doing cross-boundary business merits in-
clusion with governmental stakeholders.  At the same time, corporate 
interests are also included because they are “sectoral.”  That is, they repre-
sent manufacturers, industries, and features of modern life that have helped 
create the problem.  Yet, as was the case when Frug wrote about the legal 
place of U.S. cities, in global climate change cities are not recognized as 
meriting similar influence and a seat at the table.  This is true despite their 
being home to the majority of the world’s population. 
Frug’s analysis of this private/public divide, and its privileging of pri-
vate interests, helps illuminate the relative exclusion today—in a different 
context and nearly thirty years later—of city voices in climate change de-
bates.  That is, the exclusion of cities from a central place at the table in 
climate change discussions may be said to occur because of a fundamental 
distrust of them.  As Frug noted of U.S. cities: 
there is a widespread belief that although cities are supposed to protect the 
public interest, they cannot really be trusted to do so.  This distrust engen-
ders support for state and federal control of cities to prevent local abuse of 
power, curb local selfishness, or correct the inefficiencies resulting from 
“balkanized” local decisionmaking.  City discretion of any kind evokes 
images of corruption, patronage, and even foolishness.  This sense of ne-
cessity and desirability has made local powerlessness part of our defini-
tion of modern society, so that decentralization of power appears to be a 
nostalgic memory of an era gone forever or a dream of romantics who fail 
to understand the world as it really is.20 
Many of these arguments, albeit in softer, less caustic form, are typical 
of the objections to local involvement in global climate change debates, 
where uniformity and efficiency become the watchwords to guard against a 
“patchwork” of competing and inconsistent local initiatives.21  But Frug’s 
 
 19. Id. at 1065. 
 20. Id. at 1067. 
 21. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation:  The Case 
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1521 (2008) (exploring the positive contribu-
tion of states in development of federal policy, despite the recognition that “[t]he emerging 
patchwork of state measures seems perfectly designed to make industry nervous”); see also, 
e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:  The Case Against Real-
locating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008) (defending the 
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observations ask us to consider whether this characterization is merited. In-
deed, cities might have something useful to bring to the table when solu-
tions to climate change are debated. 
The evisceration of municipal power can be seen elsewhere in the world, 
if for different reasons.  For example, Brazil’s 1988 constitution theoreti-
cally gives equal power to the federal, state, and local governments.  How-
ever, as lawyer and urban planner Edésio Fernandes has noted, “in Brazil, 
the decision-making process of urban questions was highly centralized by 
the federal government, which treated them from a merely techno-
bureaucratic perspective.”22  Fernandes explains that this led to a depoliti-
cization of urban policy and the resulting domination of public patronage 
and clientele patterns deeply rooted in Brazilian history.23  Limited local 
control and limited participation in decisions affecting land use and envi-
ronmental management can be noted as well in anglophone Africa: 
[I]. . .n many African countries local elected councillors [sic] have little or 
no say in planning decisions which are controlled by central government.  
Equally, there is no public participation in the making of plans, or of deci-
sions on development control.  The elitist nature of planning law in Nige-
ria is therefore paralleled throughout anglophone Africa and has been ex-
tensively commented on by lawyers.24 
To be sure, the limitation of the power of cities, and particularly of 
popular representation within cities, may derive from different root causes.  
In the United States, Frug argued that cities were disempowered to promote 
private commercial interests.25  In less developed countries, in contrast, this 
may be done as an imperative of development aid that refuses to wait for 
the cumbersome process of local decision-making,26 while land use deci-
sions in other countries may have been consolidated at the national level in 
order to secure power of ruling political elites.27  Added to this reality, in 
much of the world, the populations of large areas of cities exist unheard, 
 
use, in environmental regulation of complicated issues such as global warming, of multi-
layered regulation as “dynamic” and positive); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Re-
orienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
835 (2008) (arguing that, even in the event of federal climate change regulation, there 
should be a significant role for the variety of state regulatory programs). 
 22. EDÉSIO FERNANDES, LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN BRAZIL 43 (1995). 
 23. Id. at 44. 
 24. Patrick McAuslan, Urbanization, Law and Development:  A Record of Research, in 
ILLEGAL CITIES 18, 39 (Edésio Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998). 
 25. Frug, supra note 18, at 1101-06. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Ann Varley, The Political Uses of Illegality:  Evidence From Urban Mexico, in IL-
LEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 172, 172-90. 
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parallel to, or effectively operating outside of the official legal structure.28  
Yet elsewhere, customary, heterogeneous land use practices may interfere 
with the ability of either the government—national, state, or local—or the 
private market to express itself, so that customary systems co-exist, albeit 
uncomfortably, with the private market and governmental regulations.29  In 
sum, however, the result is a silencing of local voices. 
B. Defining Interests Within Cities 
This begs the question, what “city,” exactly, would be given a voice if 
we were to craft a participatory role for urban populations in the climate 
change debates?  As noted at the outset of this Article, a majority of the 
world’s population now lives in cities, most of them in conditions of dis-
tress—from moderate to extreme poverty.30  An additional feature of much 
of this land occupation is that it can be characterized as extra-legal.  That 
is, vast swaths of the slum settlements that constitute the living conditions 
of the world’s majority exist outside of the formal state in which they exist.  
In practical terms, this can refer to those millions who live in cities without 
access to municipal services like roads, water, and sewage,31 and also for 
those who live in areas within cities controlled by violent criminal enter-
prises such that the areas are off-limits to the police, other public safety, 
and municipal services.32  This reality should give pause to those making 
climate policy at the national and international level; the views of signifi-
cant portions of the global population may not be given voice at those deci-
sion making levels.33  Surely good public policy and effective legislation 
for climate change—or any issue of import—must take into account the 
 
 28. See, e.g., Martin Delfín, UN Troops Under Fire in Haitian Slum, EL PAÍS (Spain), 
Feb. 14, 2007, at 4 (discussing a gun battle in Port-au-Prince’s Soleil slum, which is consid-
ered one of Haiti’s most dangerous); Jeffrey Gettleman, Chased by Gang Violence, Resi-
dents Flee Kenyan Slum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at A4 (discussing gang violence in 
Mathare, a group of Kenyan slums outside Nairobi, and noting that “[t]he area is notorious 
as a pocket of anarchy in a relatively orderly city”). 
 29. Alain Durand-Lasserve, Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries:  Trends 
and Issues, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 233, 235-36 (discussing the distinctiveness 
of francophone Africa). 
 30. STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, supra note 5. 
 31. See, e.g., Winnie V. Mitullah & Kivutha Kibwana, A Tale of Two Cities:  Policy, 
Law and Illegal Settlements in Kenya, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 191, 202-03 (de-
scribing characteristics of extra-legal settlements in Nairobi). 
 32. E.g., Rogelio Pérez Perdomo & Teolinda Bolívar, Legal Pluralism in Caracas, 
Venezuela, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 123, 133. 
 33. See Edésio Fernandes & Ann Varley, Law, the City and Citizenship in Developing 
Countries:  An Introduction, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 3 (“[W]e find that an aver-
age of 40 per cent and in some cases as much as 70 per cent of the population of the major 
cities are living in illegal conditions.”); see also supra note 6. 
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views of those it seeks to help and whose behavior it will regulate.34  At the 
same time, identifying appropriate representatives of those populations will 
be no easy task. 
Consequently, official, legal governments cannot necessarily be under-
stood to represent urban populations the world over.  For many, the rule of 
law shapes daily life in only the most formal sense.35  Therefore, some 
more pluralist model must be adopted to introduce urban voices—whether 
characterized as “local,” “municipal,” or “city” representatives—at the cli-
mate change policy roundtable.  The fact that so much of the world’s popu-
lation remains effectively disenfranchised from the policy decisions that 
affect them indicates that all of us must demand a search for a more inclu-
sive governance model, one that applies participatory as well as representa-
tive democratic principles to climate change governance.36  In short, this is 
to advocate consideration of a pluralist model to reshape climate change 
governance. 
Legal pluralism recognizes the diversity of existing judicial systems, of-
ten within the same society.  Although pluralism does not necessarily main-
tain that all such orders are normatively justified (or justifiable), pluralism 
does, at a minimum, support a view like the following: I recognize the exis-
tence of a non-state legal order and also understand that this order may con-
tradict the moral or political values of the larger political and social order 
where it is located.37  Initially, legal anthropologists and sociologists turned 
to pluralism to defend the legal and social orders of indigenous and tradi-
tional communities.38  More recently, legal pluralism has been used to de-
fend the interests of what might be called the “urban disenfranchised”—
 
 34. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Leonardo Avritzer, Introduction:  Opening Up 
the Canon of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY:  BEYOND THE LIBERAL DEMOC-
RATIC CANON xxxiv-lxix (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Perdomo & Bolívar, supra note 32, at 127 (“[T]he legality/illegality dual-
ism presupposes the existence of an ordered society in which the rule of law prevails and in 
which both citizens and government acknowledge their responsibility to observe or to en-
sure the observance of legal norms.”); see also Sérgio de Azevedo, Law and the Future of 
Urban Management in the Third World Metropolis, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 
258, 261 (“In the complex and rapidly changing societies of most developing countries, po-
litical participation cannot be limited to traditional institutional channels of representation 
(the right to elect and to stand for election).  It requires other, more direct, forms of democ-
racy for citizenship rights to be fully realized, especially at the local level.  In short, the 
management of public affairs is too important to be left to the government.”). 
 36. de Sousa Santos & Avritzer, supra note 34, at lxvi (insisting on “new complemen-
tarities” between participatory and representative democracy). 
 37. See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 
(1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1998). 
 38. See Merry, supra note 37, at 875-79. 
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that is, the urban poor of so many of the world’s largest cities.39  Interest-
ingly, some research suggests that the legal orders observed and imple-
mented in such communities often mirror the practices of the larger society 
(for example, in establishing land title and developing systems to mediate 
land conflicts).40  A pluralist framework offers a mechanism to identify 
concurrent legal or social orders within nation-states. 
In the climate change context, a pluralist model would permit urban in-
terests to be identified and brought to climate change discussion.  A power-
ful advantage of using such a model would be to help refocus the climate 
change debate away from the “developed” versus “developing” country 
distinction.41  Such an effort would incorporate into climate change analy-
sis and discussion not only questions of inequality between states but also 
inequality within states, comparing the behaviors of those who do not have 
and consume little within given countries against those who have and con-
sume in those same countries.  This will likely have the effect of demon-
strating how the “haves” in the developing countries benefit from this ine-
quality, revealing their role in producing climate change, while also 
identifying similar interests among the global poor, whether in “developed” 
or “developing” countries, including the heightened risks that the global 
poor face from climate change, a fact that has been extensively docu-
mented.42  A likely consequence of thus redefining the appropriate parties 
in climate change discussions would be to deepen our understanding of the 
challenges of successful climate policy change in the mega-urban centers 
where most people now live, and where they are projected to continue to 
concentrate. 
Such an approach may be justified on several grounds.  First and most 
obviously, it would satisfy the commitment to equitable solutions articu-
lated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change.43  More con-
cretely, it could reinforce another central objective of the Framework Con-
vention:  namely the desire to reduce both anthropogenic carbon emissions 
 
 39. See generally Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal Monism, and 
Pluralism, U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (unpublished draft manuscript 
on file with author). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See, e.g., Doran & Ginnochio, supra note 16, at 35-41. 
 42. Id. at 50 n.88. 
 43. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(1)-(3), May 9, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf 
[hereinafter UNFCC].  Article 3(1) articulates a commitment equity to “protect the climate 
system”.  Article 3(3) creates a duty of “taking into account different socio-economic con-
texts” and to “comprise all economic sectors” in defining policies and measures to address 
climate change. 
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and poverty.44  The voices of unrepresented parties in climate change gov-
ernance can presumably speak more eloquently to what is needed to im-
prove their quality of life, while also implementing strategies to reduce the 
effects of global warming than can their official representatives. 
In addition, there are positive social utilities to incorporating a voice for 
cities at the table of climate change governance.  First, there are significant 
spillover effects from the limited regulation of slums and shantytowns; the 
better-to-do cannot insulate themselves from the violence and other social 
and environmental ills produced by their less well-off neighbors.45  Indeed, 
it appears that when the better-to-do try to insulate themselves, by, for ex-
ample, choosing “to meet their housing needs in enclosed condominium 
developments connected to the central areas via motorways, light rail or 
metro systems,”46 their actions serve only to increase urban sprawl and its 
negative consequences for climate change, such as an increase in imperme-
able surfaces and vehicle miles traveled.47  Bringing disenfranchised repre-
sentatives of urban populations to the table in climate change negotiations 
might promote workable solutions that take account of the lives led by 
many of the world’s urban residents.  On climate-related issues such as 
 
 44. The Preamble to the UNFCC affirms, among other things, “that responses to climate 
change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated man-
ner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into account the legitimate 
priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth 
and the eradication of poverty . . . .”  See also id. art. 4(7). 
 45. For example, in Brazil, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
in cooperation with other investors, engaged in remediation problems for important water 
resources in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the country’s two largest cities.  Both the River 
Tietê, in São Paulo, and the Bay of Guanabara, in Rio de Janeiro, had been seriously pol-
luted by unregulated industrial and sewage discharges—the latter largely coming from the 
shantytowns, or favelas, that surround the cities. See SERGIO MARGULIS ET AL., BRAZIL: 
MANAGING WATER QUALITY, MAINSTREAMING THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE WATER SECTOR 
19-48 (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WD 
SP/IB/2003/03/15/000094946_03030404241233/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf; see also 
VICTOR COELHO, BAIA DE GUNABARA:  UMA HISTớRIA DE UMA AGRESSÃO AMBIENTAL [BAI 
DE GUNABARA:  A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGGRESSION] 214-22 (2007) (concluding 
that the poor urbanization surrounding the Bay contributes to its continuing degradation and 
development plans for the communities need to be implemented gradually but deliberately, 
and only then will environmental quality improve). 
 46. Azevedo, supra note 35, at 261-62. 
 47. Michael M. Maya, Note, Transportation Planning and the Prevention of Urban 
Sprawl, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879, 884 (2008) (discussing the costs of urban sprawl which in-
clude a considerable increase in the average distance suburbanites traveled between home 
and work since the beginning of the 1980s); Patrick Moulding, Note, Fare or Unfair? The 
Importance of Mass Transit for America’s Poor, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 155, 
168-69 (2005) (noting that highway construction not only has negative environmental con-
sequences on the poor but also disproportionately impacts their neighborhoods). 
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transportation and spatial planning,48 the solutions might surprise us if gen-
erated by a base that includes urban populations. 
This assumes that the interests and perspectives of governments and 
their representatives, like those of the carbon-producing industries within 
their borders, may diverge from those of the world’s urban poor.49  This 
further assumes that, in the long-term, solutions will not be workable unless 
developed and supported by all sectors of national populations.  In fact, the 
“search for broader economic and political solutions” is often impeded by 
mistrust or lack of familiarity between the urban poor, and the social and 
economic actors responsible for the operation of the formal state and econ-
omy.50 
Incorporating such urban voices in climate change governance can lead 
to more efficient solutions.  Including a wider range of urban voices in the 
process of formulating climate change policy may force serious discussion, 
for example, about densification in planning (and how to achieve it), rather 
than continued toleration of the climate-negative effects of urban sprawl.  
This would be possible because the broader model of participation envis-
aged here would result in a vigorous discussion among all social and eco-
nomic actors.  A collateral benefit of broader participation is that it would 
highlight internal differences within societies that could only help sharpen 
the tools with which climate change is addressed.51  For example, in inter-
national negotiations, China and India have been among the loudest “de-
veloping” nation voices insisting that “developed” nations should not be 
allowed to inhibit their carbon emissions until they reached a comparable 
stage of development, even as their carbon emissions soared.52  However, 
 
 48. See UNFCC, supra note 43, art. 4(1)(c) (mentioning transportation planning re-
quirements); see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change art. 10(b)(i), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (creat-
ing transportation and spatial planning commitments). 
 49. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
 50. Azevedo, supra note 35, at 262. Azevedo acknowledges that because of urban vio-
lence, the tendency of the middle class is to physically isolate themselves from the poor, and 
that: 
the middle class reaction is an understandable response to the rise in urban crime 
and violence.  However, the habit of regarding the ‘other’ (from a lower social 
group) as a potential enemy tends to reinforce ideological prejudices in the elite, 
undermining the search for broader economic and political solutions such as a re-
duction in the amount of absolute poverty . . . . 
Id. 
 51. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., Deborah E. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol and China:  Global Warming’s 
Sleeping Giant, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 407-08 (1999) (discussing the “funda-
mental rift” in the approach to climate change between developed and developing coun-
tries).  For information regarding current emissions figures see Neth. Envtl. Assessment 
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such emissions come at a cost, typically for the most politically, socially 
and economically disenfranchised members of those societies.53  At the 
same time, the elites in those societies typically demonstrate the most car-
bon-consumptive behaviors of their brethren in “developed” societies.  
Conversely, as the proliferation of climate change policies from U.S. cities 
reflects, there are significant constituencies in some localities concerned to 
reduce their carbon footprint. 54  Inserting local voices into climate change 
negotiations would likely make these internal differences more evident.  
Thus, it would be possible to craft responses that recognize the behaviors 
and needs of entire populations rather than narrow segments of individual 
societies. 
At present, however, such a discussion is difficult.  The structure of cli-
mate change discussions effectively blocks local voices. 
II.  CONSEQUENCES OF NOT HEARING FROM CITIES IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE DEBATE 
In much U.S. legal scholarship and policy analysis of climate change, 
climate change conflicts tend to be addressed as matters that can be re-
solved along one of three axes: among nations (multi-lateral discussions 
among global legal institutions), between two nations (bilateral), and be-
tween a national government and its states or other administrative units (in-
tra-national).  In addition, because many, if not most, analysts tend to view 
climate change as an economic problem that can be addressed in part by the 
law and not as an environmental problem with economic and social causes 
that can be addressed in part with legal solutions, much U.S. writing tends 
to reject the most popular proposals to address climate change as politically 
impractical, unpalatable, and/or unfair to the United States.55  Even when 
analysts avow an interest in resolving the seriousness of climate change, 
 
Agency, China Now No. 1 in CO2 Emissions; USA in Second Position, July 24, 2008, http:// 
www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsec
ondposition.html (noting that in 2006 China surpassed the United States as the largest emit-
ter of carbon dioxide).  See also Emma Graham-Harrison & Chris Buckley, China says 
Greenhouse Gases Catch up with U.S., REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.reuters. 
com/article/naturalResources/idUSPEK12708120081029 (quoting a Chinese official who 
stated “our total [greenhouse gas] emissions are about the same as the United States”). 
 53. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYN-
THESIS REPORT 65 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4 
_syr.pdf (“There are sharp differences across regions and those in the weakest economic 
position are often the most vulnerable to climate change and are frequently the most suscep-
tible to climate-related damages, especially when they face multiple stresses.”). 
 54. See supra note 16. 
 55. See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun 
Wedding:  Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21 (2008). 
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the cross-national and economic focus tends to result in conclusions that 
have the effect of tolerating the status quo, rather than pressing for a recon-
sideration of its basic features. 
A recent article by Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein helps to illustrate the 
point.56  Their analysis of the deficits of cross-national efforts to resolve 
climate change is fairly typical in two respects: (a) its conclusion that most 
such solutions are deeply unfair to some national actors, notably the United 
States;57 and (b) in its assumption that the most promising solutions for cli-
mate change are economic in nature, specifically either a cap-and-trade sys-
tem or a carbon tax.58  Although they assert that it is not their intention “to 
sketch a positive approach to climate change,”59 the net consequence of 
their analysis serves to inhibit any efforts to resolve climate change prob-
lems bilaterally or multilaterally.  Posner and Sunstein do appear to believe 
that the United States has erred in not entering into global climate change 
commitments.60  In fact, they believe that some mixture of welfarist or 
other policies probably should be adopted with respect to climate change.61  
Nonetheless, their analysis of the principal justifications, and notably the 
distributive and corrective justice defenses, for climate change policy, by 
failing to push for workable solutions to climate change, could also well 
have the result of encouraging continued inaction. 
Posner and Sunstein begin by likening the threat of climate change to 
that of an asteroid hitting the earth: 
[A]ssume that all nations are threatened by [an] asteroid . . . .  But the risk 
is not identical.  Because of its adaptive capacity, its location, its technol-
ogy, and a range of other factors, assume that the United States is less 
vulnerable to serious damage than (for example) India and the nations of 
Africa and Europe.62 
From this example63 of an asteroid hit, Posner and Sunstein continue to 
suggest that distributional or corrective justice justifications for climate 
 
 56. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 
(2008). 
 57. Id. at 1568. 
 58. Id. at 1574-75; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, art. 17 (outlining a frame-
work for emissions trading). 
 59. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1612. 
 60. See id. at 1568-69. 
 61. Id. at 1570. 
 62. Id. at 1584. 
 63. The example is laden, one might note, with unexplained assumptions that might be 
said to reveal a nationalistic hubris.  Why is our adaptive capacity necessarily greater than 
that of nations that are the lineal descendents of civilizations dating back centuries if not 
millennia?  What if our technology fails us? 
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change action are, at best, “highly imperfect”64 and “crude arguments” (be-
cause they do not appeal to any compelling national interest) at worst.65 
The distributional justice argument, in basic outline, goes something like 
this: because climate change is a global problem with disproportionate ef-
fects on poorer regions of the world, it behooves the world’s richer nations 
(which also happen to be some of the more heavily-polluting) to invest 
more in solving the problem.66  Posner and Sunstein reject this because, 
they argue, “[i]t is not at all clear that [redistribution] should take the par-
ticular form of a deal in which the United States joins an agreement that is 
not in its interest.”67  They further maintain that distributional justice to ad-
dress climate change, either by way of income transfer by rich nations to 
poor nations or heavy emission reductions limits of richer countries, simply 
does not make (economic) sense: “purely as an instrument of redistribution, 
emissions reductions on the part of the United States are quite crude.”68  
Why?  Because, they continue, “there is a highly imperfect connection be-
tween distributive goals on the one hand and requiring wealthy countries to 
pay for emissions reductions on the other.”69  Thus, they quite simply are 
not convinced that a compelling justification can be identified for the appli-
cation of distributive justice principles to combating climate change on a 
global scale.  They acknowledge as follows: 
[I]t is quite possible that 100X is better spent on malaria nets and AIDS 
drugs than on global emissions control, if the only goal is to help the poor.  
To be sure, it may be that, in fact, the best way to spend X is to cut green-
house gas emissions.  It is possible, for example, that more lives are saved 
from cutting greenhouse gas emissions than from distributing malaria nets 
and AIDS drugs, given a constant amount of money and taking into ac-
count that future lives and current lives must be put on a common metric.  
We cannot exclude this possibility, but we can say that the match between 
greenhouse gas reductions and distributive justice is quite crude.70 
Posner and Sunstein further buttress their arguments with counter-
arguments, only to shoot them down in short order.  They continue to ex-
plain, for example, that choosing to cut greenhouse emissions instead of 
giving direct aid “might be counted as a virtue because the governments of 
 
 64. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1611 (speaking specifically of corrective 
justice). 
 65. Id. at 1612. 
 66. See id. at 1570. 
 67. Id. at 1584. 
 68. Id. at 1587. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1588. 
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many poor states are either inefficient or corrupt (or both),”71 a reason that 
many programs transferring aid from developed to developing nations have 
failed to succeed.  By this logic, cutting greenhouse emissions—likely by 
means of cap-and-trade programs or a carbon tax—would be preferred to 
any other form of aid.  Yet, once again, for various reasons, including the 
uncertain future payoff of present action and the possibility of corruption in 
the distribution of carbon-reduction permits, the moral appeal of distribu-
tive justifications for climate policy are suspect for them.72  The tautologi-
cal character of these arguments merit attention: foreign aid (nation to na-
tion) tends—they say—to fall into the wrong hands, and, even though aid 
to help address some of the health side effects of climate and environ-
mental change merits our compassion, moral sentiment should not guide us 
because it will just be diverted by corruption.73  Therefore, Posner and Sun-
stein’s analysis implies, we should take our hearts off our sleeves, forget 
poverty reduction and pursue (it is suggested, if not stated) those solutions 
to global problems like climate change in our national (and perhaps com-
mon) economic interest.  Quietly and efficiently, their analysis thus pushes 
redistributive claims to the side.  Therefore, in short, distributive justice 
proves for them intellectually flabby—at least as a justification for multi-
lateral resolution of climate change problems. 
Corrective justice arguments are similarly unavailing for Posner and 
Sunstein.  As they explain, “[c]orrective justice arguments are backward-
looking, focused on wrongful behavior that occurred in the past.”74  This is 
the argument typically advanced by countries with developing economies 
undergoing spectacular industrial growth, like China and India: despite 
their new status as heavy greenhouse gas emitters, the nations first to indus-
trialize, they say, bear more responsibility now because of their historical 
contribution to the problem.  Although they acknowledge that the correc-
tive justice problem is “lamentably complex,” Posner and Sunstein main-
tain that: 
“The most general point, summarizing the argument as a whole, is that the 
climate change problem poorly fits the corrective justice model, because 
the consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many people who 
have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have 
not been victimized.”75 
 
 71. Id. at 1589. 
 72. See id. at 1590. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1592. 
 75. Id.  It should be noted, moreover, that there are areas of tort law in which we accept 
that corrective justice principles are inadequate to compensate directly for all harms, but al-
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That is to say, for example, that an environmentally conscious North 
American, who lives in a small apartment, takes the bus or rides her bike to 
work, and generally adopts behaviors designed to reduce her carbon foot-
print should not be required to shift assets (in the form of taxes that would 
then be transferred as financial assistance from the United States) to a 
country like India, where a newly rich titan of industry, living in an enor-
mous mansion and getting around in fancy, gas-guzzling imported sports 
cars, is significantly contributing to the problem, at least as judged indi-
vidually.  Thus, application of corrective justice principles is for Posner and 
Sunstein a dead end: 
The basic problem for corrective justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot 
be punished or held responsible for their behavior, or forced to compen-
sate those they have harmed.  At first glance, holding Americans today re-
sponsible for the activities of their ancestors is not fair or reasonable on 
corrective justice grounds, because current Americans are not the relevant 
wrongdoers; they are not responsible for the harm.76 
This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for them to endorse corrective 
justice as a justification for climate change policy and response: such justi-
fications rely heavily upon “notions of collective responsibility that are not 
easy to defend.”77  Certainly if one analyzes climate change problems as 
matters for state resolution by use of corrective justice to effect economic 
redistribution at an international scale, this may be true. 
Posner and Sunstein maintain that their goal “has been to clarify the uses 
and limits” of distributional and corrective justice arguments, “in a way 
that might bear not only on climate change, but also on a wide range of 
other questions raised when some nations make claims on others.”78  Yet 
despite this recognition, they remain open to the criticism that they have 
boxed themselves in by their nation-centric perspective.  Because their 
units of analysis are the nations at the table of climate change discussions, 
they are not forced to grapple with the mosaic of climate change effects en-
 
low compensation nonetheless.  A notable example is market share liability.  See, e.g., RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 26 cmt. n (2000); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b), (c) (1979).  In the environmental context, an ex-
ample is joint and several strict liability for a wide range of actors, including those who did 
not actually cause the harm.  See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2002).  Of course, these examples do not 
mirror the situation described by Posner and Sunstein, whereby some who did not harm are 
compensating some who have not been harmed. 
 76. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1593. 
 77. Id. at 1602.  As noted above, tort law deals, if imperfectly, with compensation for 
collective harms all the time. 
 78. Id. at 1612. 
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dured by people and places who happen to live on one side or another of a 
national boundary.79 
It should be emphasized that Posner and Sunstein, and many others like 
them, are not foes of climate regulation, or at least not of policies that may 
increase quality of life and standard of living, making adaptation to climate 
change more broadly possible.80  Nonetheless, their argument figuratively 
rejects a search for inclusive climate change solutions and is nation-centric 
in its examination of the problem.  It assumes that the poor within the bor-
ders of each state are represented by and cared for by their respective gov-
ernments.  Yet, in a world evermore characterized by income inequality 
within nations,81 this is arguably not a correct, much less a useful or infor-
mative way to analyze such redistributive or corrective justice possibilities.  
The elite in São Paulo, Mexico City, or Mumbai, for example, are likely to 
have far more in common with the elite in Washington, D.C., London, or 
Frankfurt, just as the most economically and socially disadvantaged mem-
bers of each of those places has more in common with their counterparts 
 
 79. It should be stressed that this criticism relies upon the conclusion that the limitations 
of their argument are typical rather than unique.  Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, for 
example, similarly favor entry of the United States into multilateral climate agreements yet 
note, with some sympathy, the reasons U.S. interests object to doing so.  See Stewart & 
Wiener, supra note 3, at 51-52 (observing that “the advantages and disadvantages of joining 
the Kyoto Protocol ‘as is’ appear to us to be fairly closely balanced”). 
 80. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1584-85.  The authors note that: 
If resources should be redistributed from rich to poor on the ground that redistri-
bution would increase overall welfare or promote fairness, the intuition appears 
sound.  But there is an immediate problem:  If redistribution from rich nations to 
poor nations is generally desirable, it is not at all clear that it should take the par-
ticular form of a deal in which the United States joins an agreement that is not in 
its interest.  Other things being equal, the more sensible kind of redistribution 
would be a cash transfer, so that poor nations can use the money as they see fit.  
Perhaps India would prefer to spend the money on education, or on AIDS preven-
tion, or on health care generally.  If redistribution is what is sought, a generous 
deal with respect to the threat of an asteroid collision seems a crude way of 
achieving it. 
Id. 
 81. Media Eghbal, Brazil’s New Middle Class Has a Growing Appetite for Consump-
tion, EUROMONITOR INT’L, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.euromonitor.com/Brazils_new_ 
middle_class_has_a_growing_appetite_for_consumption (noting that in 2006 the richest 
10% accounted for 46% of national income, which is slightly higher than a decade ago); 
David Cay Johnston, Income Gap Is Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at 
C1 (noting that in the United States, in 2005, the top 10% of Americans collected 48.5% of 
reported income up from roughly 33% in the late 1970’s); Hu Jintao Vows to Reverse In-
come Disparity, HINDU, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/16/stories/200710 
1654761400.htm (stating that China’s richest 10% hold more than 40% of the nation’s 
wealth and that regionally the GDP of the wealthiest province is more than ten times that of 
the poorest province).  Income inequality is a growing characteristic of U.S. society as well.  
See, e.g., Elizabeth Gudrais, Unequal America, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 2008, at 22. 
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elsewhere.  This Article suggests that examining the behaviors of these 
groups in terms of their class and social privilege could help us rethink na-
tional debate and evaluate individual and social class behaviors in climate 
change dialogue.  Perhaps by defining shared legal, social, and economic 
interests across national boundaries, justifications for redistributive or cor-
rective action could be identified that would simultaneously address pov-
erty and the excessive burden that climate change promises to impose on 
the world’s poor. 
III.  REFOCUSING THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE AND NORM 
ARTICULATION BY CITY VOICES 
Focusing on the behaviors and necessities of the urban poor across the 
world’s cities may help clarify the most appropriate mechanisms to arrest 
climate change for at least three reasons.  First, the slums of major cities 
concentrate populations and thus common interests and needs.  Second, by 
virtue of this concentration, the urban environments where most people live 
literally can be hothouses, both in temperature and social condition, that 
bring into focus the problems that most merit attention.  Third, such focus 
will redirect attention to urban land uses.  Land use practices represent the 
second-largest challenge in addressing climate change, yet are usually un-
derstood only in terms of agriculture and forestry uses, .82  Surely urban 
land use merits inclusion in this category as well, demanding our attention 
to the ways in which land is used, and by whom, in the dominant form of 
human habitation today. 
Because the shape of cities is a land use issue, we should give special at-
tention to the mechanisms of growth in the world’s cities.  Furthermore, as 
already noted, because many of the world’s urban residents are not effec-
tively represented in urban decision making, there is urgency to identify 
more participatory mechanisms to assure that the voices of more urban 
residents are incorporated into this process.  Before articulating the norma-
tive values that including urban voices in climate change governance might 
generate, however, it is important understand what voices are presently 
 
 82. Daniel Bodansky, International Sectoral Agreements in a Post-2012 Climate 
Framework 12 (May 2007) (unpublished working paper, available at http://www.pewcli-
mate.com/docUploads/International%20Sectoral%20Aggreements%20in%20a%20Post-
2012%20Climate%20Framework.pdf) [hereinafter Bodansky, International Sectoral] (not-
ing that land use is the second highest source of increased anthropogenic carbon emissions).  
Oddly, however, and following Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change and United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change practice, "land use" is defined as refer-
ring to agriculture and forestry only.  As understood here, this requires viewing land use in 
its largest, most comprehensive sense, including urban use of land as well. 
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heard and the justifications for listening to them as opposed to more local-
ized voices. 
A. Who Is Heard in Climate Change Discussions 
One is hard-pressed to find U.S. climate change analysts who focus on 
urban groups, especially the poor who constitute the majority of the 
world’s urban population.  In addition to global political institutions and 
national governments, analysts note the roles of “multinational corporate” 
interests in the definition of new “assumptive frameworks” about energy 
sources and supplies.83  The perspectives of non-governmental organiza-
tions also merit consideration.84  There is also a pronounced sectoral analy-
sis from those who believe that we should focus first on responses among 
industrial and economic “sectors” (the manufacturing sector, the transporta-
tion sector, and the energy sector),85 either in the first instance or as part of 
an “integrated” strategy that includes bilateral and multilateral responses.86  
There are also many who argue that state (that is, intra-national) adminis-
trative units should have primacy over national (and in the case of the 
United States, at least, federal) government control.87 
At the international and national levels, it is argued that for the purpose 
of uniformity, national actors are better equipped than smaller political and 
administrative units to prevent the proverbial “race to the bottom.”88  Thus, 
in global climate change matters, the subsidiarity principle, which dictates 
that the smallest possible administrative unit should be used to resolve 
problems, is found wanting: 
[T]he traditional arguments for decentralization of authority over local 
drinking water, land use, and the like do not apply with equivalent force. 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, the global nature of climate change 
would counsel greater centralization of policy decisions into national, if 
 
 83. Doran & Ginnochio, supra note 16, at 5. 
 84. Kal Raustiala & Natalie L. Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors In The Global Climate Re-
gime (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-
29, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028603. 
 85. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 1502. 
 86. Daniel Bodansky & Elliot Diringer, Towards an Integrated Multi-Track Climate 
Framework (Dec. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/ 
docUploads/Multi-Track-Report.pdf). For Bodansky and Diringer, the “bottom-up” ap-
proach refers to national proposals advanced for international consideration. 
 87. See Adler, supra note 3, at 445 n.15 (citing various articles articulating preference 
for state or local climate control legislation in the United States); Driesen, supra note 14, at 
41. 
 88. Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: 
A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997). 
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not international, hands, and less authority for state and local govern-
ments.89 
A basic problem represented by such conclusions, however, is that nei-
ther government and industry,90 nor “environmentalists”91 may represent 
the interests of most of the world’s overwhelmingly poor and increasingly 
urban population.  For this reason, the notion that the subsidiarity principle 
only allows global responses turns the principle on its head. 
Some proposals reflect an attempt to account for inter- and intra-national 
difference, such as the “integrated multi-track” proposal advocated by the 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change.92  Clearly, there are administrative 
advantages to such approaches, not least the likelihood of securing recipro-
cal commitments and uniform, predictable results.93 
In contrast, concerns proliferate about localized decision-making in the 
climate change context.  Some are familiar from other contexts, such as 
worries about rent-seeking behavior94 and free riders.95  Other concerns are 
based on the global reality of climate change, the magnitude of which re-
quires international agreement.96  Once again, however, even with propos-
als that strive to respect differences in national conditions,97 it remains true 
that much of the world’s population is not represented by governments or 
major social and private corporate institutions.  Thus, if we are truly to ad-
dress global climate change, there must be a mechanism established to in-
clude these subordinated voices. 
B. Towards New Governance Norms: Some Benefits of Listening to 
Cities and Shantytowns 
One might ask what cities would have to add to the climate change de-
bate that is not already known.  In the course of considering these benefits, 
however, it is important also to acknowledge the potential practical diffi-
 
 89. Adler, supra note 3, at 447-48 (emphasis added). 
 90. Bodansky & Diringer, supra note 86, at 7-19. 
 91. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 1541-43 (delineating arguments that would 
likely be advanced by “environmentalists”). 
 92. Bodansky, International Sectoral, supra note 82. 
 93. Bodansky & Diringer, supra note 86, at 5. 
 94. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits:  Rent-Seeking Behind the 
Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM:  GOING BEHIND THE GREEN 1, 8-9 (Terry 
L. Anderson ed., 2000) (summarizing examples of regional rent-seeking in environmental 
law). 
 95. Adler, supra note 3, at 448. 
 96. Id. at 447-48. 
 97. See, e.g., Bodansky, International Sectoral, supra note 82. 
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culties of giving city or local voices a greater role in the development of 
climate change law and policy. 
1. Adding Unheard Voices 
Large swaths of the world’s cities now exist off the official grid.  Often, 
these areas are effectively off-limits to official authorities.98  The result is 
the growth of cities that can resemble more of a collection of city-states in 
the medieval mold, where security and services are controlled within the 
community rather than provided across communities99 than the urban-
suburban or regional government and cooperative models more familiar to 
English-speaking North America and Europe.  As a result, the people mak-
ing the policy and enacting the laws that nominally govern an area within a 
city in fact have little functional authority over it, much less a notion of 
how life is lived there.  This can only have a negative effect on efforts to 
apply policy (of whatever kind) to such areas.  In the context of climate 
change, this matters because redesigning our urban environments should be 
a key goal of climate change response. 
As noted at the outset of this Article, for instance, many urban environ-
ments are increasingly quite violent.100  This is hardly surprising, since 
residents are crammed together with inadequate services, little green space 
or other recreational areas, few employment opportunities, and, often, poor 
sanitation.  Importantly, these conditions also have consequences for cli-
mate change policy.  Several examples can be cited that reflect the connec-
tion of slum growth and climate change.  For example, expanding urban ar-
eas, and mostly expansion of unplanned growth by urban migrants, is 
rapidly eating up precious forests—forests that provide irreplaceable car-
bon sinks.101  This is true in countries as different from one another as Bra-
 
 98. See, e.g., Tranqüilidade e tensão nas fronteiras da cidade partida [Tranquility and 
tension on the border of the divided city], JORNAL DO BRASIL (Braz.), July 27, 2008, at A20  
(noting the absence of the state in the shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro, despite their proximity 
to prosperous neighborhoods). 
 99. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 17 (reporting that “[i]n the Amazon, one of the world’s fast-
est-growing urban frontiers, 80 percent of city growth has been in shantytowns largely un-
served by established utilities and municipal transport”). 
 100. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 101. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6; Mary Christina 
Wood, Law and Climate Change:  Government’s Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, 38 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10652, 10659 (2008) (maintaining that we should protect 
remaining carbon sinks that have capacity to cleanse the atmosphere of carbon); Mark 
Squillace, From “Navigable Waters” to “Constitutional Waters”: The Future of Federal 
Wetlands Regulation, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 808 (2007) (observing that “wetlands, 
like forests, provide a substantial carbon sink that can help mitigate the impact of climate 
change”). 
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zil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, where rainforests are daily 
threatened by urban expansion.102  Another example to be cited relates to 
sanitation.  The lack of sanitation has implications for climate change-
related issues as varied as sedimentation in water courses and the water 
quality of coastlines.103  However, these problems cannot be solved merely 
with the imposition of international trading schemes in carbon dioxide or a 
uniform carbon tax.  Specifically, correcting these effects demands an inte-
grated approach that understands urban poverty reduction as a central ele-
ment in any climate change policy.  For example, investments in housing 
and education might indeed be understood as part of a climate change in-
vestment program with both broadly and narrowly focused goals.104 
This should not be understood as essential merely by appeal to a moral 
interest, as some commentators contend.105  On the contrary, there is an 
immediate and pressing interest in violence reduction in urban slums for 
those both inside and outside of the countries where such violence occurs.  
This is so in the first instance because of spillover social and environmental 
effects.106  For example, the economy of many slums in South America is 
sustained by drug and, specifically, cocaine traffic, with the demand for 
those drugs coming principally from Europe and English-speaking North 
America.107  Growing coca plants has consequences for agricultural land 
 
 102. Colin Crawford, Protecting Environmentally-Sensitive Areas and Promoting Tour-
ism in “The Back Patio of the United States”: Thoughts about Shared Responsibilities in 
Ecosystem and Biodiversity Protection, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41, 63-81 (2006-
2007); Colin Crawford, The Insistent (and Unrelenting) Challenges of Protecting Biodiver-
sity in Brazil:  Finding “The Law That Sticks,” 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1, 15-19 
(2007); Colin Crawford, Social and Cultural Protection and Environmental Justice:  Lessons 
of the Colombian Model (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 103. Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz et al., Freshwater Resources and Their Management, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY.  CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 173, 178-79 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter3.pdf  (discussing the 
effects of climate change on water quality in freshwater systems); Robert J. Nicholls et al., 
Coastal systems and low-lying areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, 
AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Supra, at 315, 319, 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter6.pdf (dis-
cussing the effects of increasing human utilization of coastal zones). 
 104. In contrast to the view of Posner & Sunstein, for example, who appear to assume 
that expenditures for education, housing or other social goals are not correlated to climate 
control.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1584-85. 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 1572. 
 106. Driesen, supra note 55, at 21 (maintaining that various spillover effects are not well 
accounted for by market liberalism). 
 107. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT 70 (2008), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf 
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use, and thus for climate policy.108  But it also helps to sustain centers of 
violence, and a culture that creates parallel judicial orders within states and 
cities.109  Such drug-controlled communities largely exist apart from the 
formal state.110 
Thus, one needs to ask, how can green space initiatives, new sanitation 
systems, or efficient transportation systems—all essential elements of a 
climate change strategy—be introduced in such areas?  One way to begin 
to address this question would be through the application of a judicial plu-
ralist framework that would attempt to do two things.  First, it would rec-
ognize the existence of such parallel orders as a first step in bringing disen-
franchised voices into the climate change debate.  Second, it would seek to 
accommodate the values and needs reflected in such parallel orders within 
the larger state.  This is not, it should be stressed, to argue that a drug lord 
in control of a shantytown deserves a seat at the table in international cli-
mate change negotiations.  However, community voices from disenfran-
chised urban areas need, somehow, to be systematically integrated into 
climate change discussions. 
Far from being based in abstract moral commitments like Posner’s and 
Sunstein’s straw men of distributive or corrective justice, the spillover ef-
fects could threaten the well-being of the better-off not only in “develop-
ing” countries, but in their more prosperous neighbors as well.  Suppose, 
for example, that Brazil’s hot, dry summer of 2006 continued for more than 
one year—along with the violence that characterized that year.  This could 
 
(stating that in 2007 the total area under coca cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru was 
448,743 acres, an area slightly smaller than Delaware); U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
WORLD DRUG REPORT 2005:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 16 (2005), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_ex_summary.pdf (noting that in 2003 the 
value of the global illicit drug market was estimated, in U.S. dollars, at $13B at the produc-
tion level, $94B at the wholesale level, and $322B at the retail level). 
 108. Cheri-Lynn Wortham, Comment, Methamphetamine and Cocaine Manufacturing 
Effects On the Environment And Agriculture, 17 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 343 (2007-
2008); Coca Trade and Land Use Changes (Am. Univ., Case Studies No. 16, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.american.edu/TED/coca.htm; supra note 6 and accompanying text (de-
tailing the global concern with agricultural land use as a climate change source).  In a coun-
try like Colombia, where the negative agricultural implications of drug crops are widely 
appreciated, this is a frequent subject of academic commentary.  See, e.g., César Ortiz, Agri-
cultura, Cultivos Ilícitos y Médio Ambiente en Colombia, in GUERRA, SOCIEDAD Y MEDIO 
AMBIENTE 297, 297 (Martha Cárdenas & Manuel Rodríguez Becerra eds., 2004). 
 109. See, e.g., ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW UR-
BAN WORLD 256-61 (2005); Pérez Perdomo & Bolívar, supra note 32, at 133.  The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime promotes programs to give “farmers an economically 
viable, legal alternative to growing coca or opium.”  See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
UNODC AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-
development/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 110. See supra note 109. 
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ultimately disrupt the smooth functioning of Brazilian industry, with rever-
berations in global manufacturing and financial markets.111  It could lead to 
increased migration—both within nations and across borders, with devas-
tating social and environmental effects.112  In short, it is naïve to suppose 
that only “many millions of poor people would be hurt by the cost of emis-
sions reductions. . . . [bearing] that cost in the form of higher energy bills, 
lost jobs, and increased poverty.”113  Poverty may be a problem, as the ad-
age has it, that will always be with us, but to neglect poverty reduction as 
an essential component of climate change policy would be foolhardy.  We 
can run, but we cannot hide from the disruptions that will result in an ever 
hotter and more climate-uncertain planet. 
2. Proposals for Infrastructure and Land Reforms: Local Thinking to Aid 
Global Action 
Another way in which cities would introduce an essential voice in cli-
mate change discussions would be with respect to infrastructure planning 
and land reform.  As noted earlier, land use is cited as a major climate 
change sectoral concern.114  However, as already noted, this typically is 
understood to refer to agricultural land use, and not the intensive urban land 
use in which most of the world’s population is now engaged worldwide.115  
Cities, however, have much to teach—and much to do—in this respect.  
For example, urban areas are expanding exponentially, and with them im-
permeable surfaces that are turning them into heat islands.116  Cities are 
also expanding because of deforestation (a consequence of poor planning 
 
 111. See Andrew Downie, Brazil's Slums Face a New Problem: Vigilante Militias; Off-
duty and Former Police, Prison Guards, and Firefighters Are Moving in to Oust the Drug 
Gangs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 8, 2007 (commenting on the assaults on police sta-
tions, banks, supermarkets, and buses in São Paulo in May 2006 that brought the city to a 
standstill); Larry Rohter, Police Are Criticized in Wave of Gang Violence in Brazil, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A3 (reporting on the violence in São Paulo in early May 2006 that 
left at least 186 dead and brought the city to a standstill). 
 112. This potential has already been well-documented.  See, e.g., Edésio Fernandes & 
Raquel Rolnik, Law and Urban Change in Brazil, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 140, 
140-44 (describing non-participatory urban planning despite high internal urban migration 
rates throughout twentieth century); see generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: 
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001); Gregory S. McCue, Environmental 
Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 163-65 (1993) (discussing the often negative effects of mass mi-
grations on the local environment). 
 113. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1587. 
 114. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 7-8. 
 116. HOWARD FRUMKIN ET AL., URBAN SPRAWL AND PUBLIC HEALTH:  DESIGNING, PLAN-
NING, AND BUILDING FOR HEALTHY COMMUNITIES 83-89 (2004). 
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and/or uncontrolled development), with the resulting loss of vegetative 
cover and the carbon heat sinks they constitute.117  Moreover, many of the 
world’s largest cities are coastal and so are especially susceptible to the sea 
level rise accompanying global warming.118 
However, particularly in the less-developed world, such planning tends 
to operate in a “depoliticized and technocratic way” that does not involve 
participation from many of those who will, in theory, be subject to its regu-
lation.119  Many areas targeted for land use regulation effectively fall out-
side the official urban grid and are not effectively controlled by the central 
state.  Future climate change-related spatial planning must take this reality 
into account.  Therefore, any sustained effort to introduce the kind of land 
use and environmental planning necessary to reduce heat islands and simi-
lar phenomena must be reformulated to take account of these areas and the 
views of their residents. 
Examples exist of the ordered resolution of social conflicts within even 
the poorest slums.  Take, for example, the huge satellite city of Bogotá, Co-
lombia known as Jerusalem.  Jerusalem “is one of the quarters with the 
highest number of buildings lacking titles in Ciudad Bolívar.”120  Ciudad 
Bolívar, in turn, is located in the southwest part of the city: 
[t]he district counts 658,477 inhabitants, 12,998 hectares [50.2 sq. miles], 
and 252 quarters. In terms of population it ranks fourth in the city and its 
inhabitants represent approximately 10% of the population of [Bogotá] . . 
. . 95% of the population lives in poverty conditions . . . . [Jerusalem is] 
one of the poorest, most populated zones with the highest number of prob-
lems regarding informality in all of Bogotá.121 
Nonetheless, a relatively ordered, concurrent system of property title trans-
fer exists within Jerusalem and owners object to any title “regularization” 
of the land’s inhabitants without compensation.122 
 
 117. Rômulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties : The Evolv-
ing Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism 
Ten Years After the Kyoto Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634, 636-38 (2008). 
 118. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide:  Assessing the Risks of Climate Change 
and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 17, 21-
22 (2007), available at http://eau.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/17 (noting that low 
elevation coastal zones, defined as land areas contiguous with the coastline up to a ten meter 
rise elevation, contain 2% of the world's land and 10% of its population, or slightly more 
than 600  million people). 
 119. See, e.g., Fernandes & Rolnik, supra note 112, at 140.  See generally THE CHAL-
LENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN URBAN AREAS 181-298 (Adrian Atkinson et al. 
eds., 2000). 
 120. Bonilla Maldonado, supra note 39, at 13, 16. 
 121. Id. at 16-17. 
 122. Id. at 18. 
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In other countries, the practical problems may differ from this example 
because extra-legal occupations occur on public and not private land.123  
That fact does not make their resolution less complicated.  Nonetheless, 
this Article suggests that a judicial pluralist model that would recognize the 
reality of these extra-legal settlements, and the way in which they have or-
dered land, would constitute an important first step.  Doing so would allow 
the official state to begin to understand the land use challenges faced by 
these communities.  In the context of climate change governance, this could 
force a discussion about a truly integrated land use plan, one that would 
seek to identify solutions that recognize extra-legal development patterns.  
By giving a voice to the residents of such shantytowns and extra-legal set-
tlements, it will be possible to identify solutions that both take account of 
and seek to respond to their reality.  Ultimately, this could lead to difficult 
discussions, for example, about achieving density or public spending for 
efficient transportation options.  This argument makes no assumption that 
incorporating such voices will be simple or produce easy-to-achieve solu-
tions.  It suggests, however, that in the areas of climate change regulation 
involving land and resource use, it is essential to hear from those who stand 
most to be affected. 
Immediate objections to such a proposal likely will focus on the fact that 
the occupations were extra-legal.  “These people,” it may be said, “have no 
right to the land and so do not deserve a place at any table on how to use 
it.”  At a municipal or other local level, however, any such objection would 
be rather like insisting that a slang word not be allowed into a dictionary 
because it is not “real English.”  Extra-legal occupations have become a de-
fining aspect of global cities and one that has serious implications for land 
use and thus climate change.  They must be recognized, therefore, as a cen-
tral challenge to be addressed by any climate change policy.  At least with 
respect to land use planning reform, official governments in less developed 
countries recognize this by way of programs that seek to “regularize” such 
 
 123. For example, in Brazil “occupations” or “invasions” of public land provide constant 
fodder for public concern.  See, e.g., Luis Felipe Reis, Associação Denuncia Desmatamento 
Irregular: Construções de Luxo Avançam Pela Floresta de Tijuca [Neighborhood Associa-
tion Denounces Irregular Deforestation: Luxury Constructions Advance Towards the Tijuca 
National Forest], JORNAL DO BRASIL (Braz.), July 5, 2008, at R2; Favelas Derrubam Areas 
Nobres [Shantytowns Destroy Noble Areas], JORNAL DO BRASIL (Braz.), March 23, 2008, at 
R2 (describing how extra-legal occupations have destroyed property values of surrounding 
legal settlements by as much as 60%).  See generally LAND RIGHTS & INNOVATION:  IMPROV-
ING TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN POOR (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002) (containing essays 
on extra-legal occupation and their social, economic, and environmental consequences, on 
both public and private land, worldwide); McAuslan, supra note 24. 
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areas.124  However, many such programs do not begin from a pluralist per-
spective but, instead, seek to impose an external order without considering 
the circumstances and realities of those living in shantytowns and extra-
legal settlements.125  Therefore, future climate change policy will need to 
develop new strategies that both recognize and seek to interact with most of 
the residents of the world’s cities.  Part IV of this Article offers a frame-
work to begin to do this. First, however, another benefit of giving voice in 
climate change governance to unheard city voices can be noted. 
3. Focus on Environmental Justice in Climate Change Governance 
Neglecting cities in climate change debates is likely to have the effect of 
minimizing a deeper understanding of the health consequences of climate 
change.  Specifically, urban areas typically constitute toxic “hot spots,” ar-
eas where dangerous air and other pollutants are concentrating, with nega-
tive effects on their residents.126  An often-stated concern about the adop-
tion of the most popular climate change solution, namely a carbon trading 
system, is that it will intensify the growth of such hot spots.127  It seems 
 
 124. One such example is the “favela-bairro” (shantytown to neighborhood) program in 
Rio de Janeiro, funded in part by the Inter-American Development Bank.  See Inter-
American Development Bank, Programa de Urbanizacao de Assentamentos Populares do 
Rio de Janeiro [Urbanization Program for Popular Settlements of Rio de Janeiro] (project 
summary available at MIT’s Urban Upgrading Site, http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/ 
upgrading/case-examples/ce-BL-fav.html) (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 125. Education of technocrats and professionals accustomed to the administration of non-
participatory, top-down plans is difficult but not impossible.  One example of a successful 
challenge to such management was the waste management scheme implemented in Accra, 
Ghana.  See Ben K. Doe & Doris Tetteh, The Working Group Approach to Environmental 
Management under the Accra Sustainable Programme, in THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL MANAGEMENT IN URBAN AREAS, supra note 119, at 171, 178-79. 
 126. Victor B. Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of Federal Hazard-
ous Air Pollution Regulation and What We Can Learn from the States, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
107, 111 (2007). 
 127. Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate 
Change 52-53 (KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-052, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1026353 (noting this concern in California debates).  But see DeShazo & Freeman, 
supra note 21, at 1541-42.  The authors state that: 
[greenhouse gas, or] GHG emissions that lead to global warming are different 
from conventional pollutants. They do not cause harm primarily as a result of lo-
cal exposures, but because of the stock of GHGs that accumulate in the atmos-
phere regardless of where the gases are emitted. Nor do they cause interstate spill-
overs in the traditional sense, by shifting harmful pollutants from one (usually 
upwind) jurisdiction to another (usually downwind). Unlike acid rain or the pol-
lutants that create smog, it matters not for global warming whether one is a 
downwind or an upwind state. Rather, global warming is more like the destruction 
of the ozone layer—it creates externalities on a global scale. 
Id. 
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only logical then, to avoid undesirable secondary effects of climate change 
that is globally smart and locally dangerous, that those who stand to be 
most affected by the expansion of hot spots—namely the global urban 
poor—be included in the delineation of a global climate policy that can be 
sustained in the long term. 
Another popular economic solution to climate change, specifically a car-
bon use tax, is similarly problematic because it would be regressive.128  By 
virtue of this basic inequality, it makes sense to include those who stand to 
be disproportionately burdened by the solution to be involved in its applica-
tion. 
Thus, the inclusion of urban voices advanced in this Article would serve 
the inclusive, participatory goals of the environmental justice movement.129  
A related, additional benefit of doing this would be to forestall the possibil-
ity of increased violence in the poor areas of our mega-cities.  As noted ear-
lier, the relationship between violence and increased temperatures is a phe-
nomenon that has received strong support in empirical research on the 
subject.130  If, along with temperature rise, poor areas also become toxic 
hotspots and/or suffer regressive carbon taxes that lead to social protest, 
social and economic chaos is likely to follow. 
IV.  THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 
Given the complicated, pluralistic reality of the world’s mega-cities, the 
challenge is to define the appropriate urban group or groups to participate 
in climate change governance.  One possible means to do so would be 
through a deliberate, measured application of a pluralist model that seeks to 
promote participatory, representative democratic governance.  The goal 
will be to ensure that unheard urban voices are incorporated into climate 
change policy and response. 
Promisingly, commentators have begun to propose models that would 
permit more nuanced responses to climate change governance that would 
allow recognition of non-nation state, and even local, actors.  Hari Osofsky, 
for example, argues “the farther one moves from the strict Westphalian 
model” of international law, namely the notion that international order is 
based upon consent between “sovereign and equal nation-states,” the more 
possible it becomes to allow for different conceptions, notions that do not 
 
 128. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1586 (noting regressive nature of a carbon tax). 
 129. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RA-
CISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 103-21 (2001) (describing 
some of the promise and pitfalls of different participatory models in environmental justice 
conflicts). 
 130. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
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necessarily “presume[] that the nation-state is impenetrable.”131  She and 
others have examined “bottom-up lawmaking” for climate change action in 
the context of U.S. cities, whereby “[i]n their day-to-day microdecisions, 
cities engage with other private and nonprofit actors in an organic lawmak-
ing process whereby practices become norms and norms embed in law.”132  
Judith Resnik and others have argued for according special status to what 
they call “translocal organizations of government actors,” in order, they 
maintain, to break the horizontal and vertical thinking that dominates the 
“federalism grid” in thinking about climate change solutions.133  Others ar-
gue that applying international relations theory to the behavior of cities can 
deepen analyses of “cities’ motivation and function as attracting capital or 
serving as neutral ‘markets’ or ‘bankable’ locations” and thus their role in 
shaping a response to climate change.134  All of this work has a common 
dedication to identifying roles for local governments in the shaping of cli-
mate change policy.  What it lacks, however, is an appreciation that even 
local governments may not in fact represent the views of many, if not most 
of their inhabitants. 
One opportunity to begin to allow a means to give a meaningful voice to 
unrepresented urban voices is to structure urban involvement in environ-
mental land management decisions relating to climate change modeled on 
the successes of participatory budgeting across the world. 
The participatory budget: 
[I]s an emanation of the theory of participatory democracy, which main-
tains that citizens must participate directly in political decisions and not 
merely, as representative democracy would have it, in the choice of politi-
cal decision makers.  It is, therefore, a system of co-governance in which 
civil society, far from being a haven of survival before an absent or hos-
tile state, is rather a regular and well-organized way of exerting public 
 
 131. Hari M. Osofsky, The Georgraphy of Climate Change Litigation Part II:  Narratives 
of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 578-579 (2008). 
 132. Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks? Local Climate 
Change Coaltions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 413 (2008). 
 133. Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level:  Sovereigntism, Federalism, 
and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (Togas), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008); 
see also Parick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get out of the Way:  The States Tackle Climate 
Change with Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453 (2008). 
 134. Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons: 
Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change 16 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper 
No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267314. 
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control over the state by means of institutionalized forms of cooperation 
and conflict.135 
Declared by the United Nations to be one of the world’s forty best urban 
management programs,136 the participatory budget first was conducted in 
the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989 and has been a staple of 
that city’s operations ever since.  Today it is used throughout cities in Latin 
America, Spain, France, Italy, Canada, and in two widely different Indian 
states, Kerala and West Bengal.137  Although the process is a “very dy-
namic social and political process,” making it difficult “to draw from it 
many conclusions or projections,” the participatory budget “has been a re-
markable means of promoting citizen participation in decisions concerning 
distributive justice, the effectiveness of decisions, and the accountability” 
of elected political leaders.138  In other words, participatory budgeting pro-
vides an example of democracy emerging from below and not being im-
posed from above. 
If one considers the possible application of the participatory budget in 
the context of urban climate change governance along these three axes139 
alone, it becomes evident that it offers a promising model for a more inclu-
sive form of climate change governance.  Before doing so, however, it is 
useful to briefly describe the evolution of the participatory budget process 
in Porto Alegre, Brazil where the idea become a reality. 
A. The Example of Participatory Budgeting  
To understand the implications and possibilities of a participatory cli-
mate change governance model based on the participatory budget model, it 
is essential to consider the governance traditions against which the idea of 
the participatory budget reacted as it was originally developed and imple-
mented in southern Brazil.  Two principal features of the prevailing modes 
of Brazilian socio-economic and political life can be observed: an authori-
tarian political tradition and a deeply unequal society both socially and 
economically.  As de Sousa Santos explains: 
Brazil is a society with a long tradition of authoritarian politics.  The pre-
dominance of an oligarchic, patrimonialist and bureaucratic model of 
 
 135. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a 
Redistributive Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 307, 307-08 
[hereinafter de Sousa, Participatory Budgeting]. 
 136. Id. at 307. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 357. 
 139. Namely those cited in the previous paragraph—participation concerning distributive 
justice, effective decisions, and political accountability. 
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domination has resulted in a state formation, a political system and culture 
characterized by the following: political and social marginalization of the 
popular classes . . . ; restriction of the public sphere and its privatization 
by the patrimonialist elites; “artificiality” of the democratic game and the 
liberal ideology resulting in a huge discrepancy between the “legal coun-
try” and the “real country”. . . . Brazil is also a society characterized by 
outrageous social inequalities, which have in fact increased tremendously 
in the past 20 years . . . .140 
As noted in Part I, these authoritarian and unequal traditions lamentably 
dominate life for millions the world over. 
The implementation of the participatory budget in Porto Alegre was no 
accident.  Porto Alegre, Brazil’s tenth most-populous city and the capital of 
the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, was an early site of 
success for the Brazilian Worker’s Party, which took power in January 
1989 with a commitment to “popular administration.”141  In addition, 
“[l]ike other Brazilian capitals, in the last decades of the twentieth century 
Porto Alegre experienced an accelerated process of urbanization,” with its 
population doubling between 1960-1980.142  Despite the authoritarian and 
unequal characteristics of Brazilian society, Porto Alegre was especially 
well positioned for an experiment in participatory politics.  Its indices of 
educational achievement, along with social indicators such as life expec-
tancy and infant mortality, were better than the Brazilian norm.143  In addi-
tion, “Porto Alegre is a city of ample democratic traditions, a strong, highly 
organized civil society” and was a source of resistance during the last mili-
tary dictatorship, from 1964-1984.144 
The newly elected political leadership focused on the budget when 
elected to the mayoralty of Porto Alegre, as “[t]he budget is the basic tool 
of the political contract underlying . . . relations [between the state and the 
citizens] and the interactions of the various state organisms charged with 
executing such a contract.”145  Importantly, however, as implemented in 
Porto Alegre, “[t]he participatory budget and its institutional framework 
 
 140. de Sousa, Participatory Budgeting, supra note 135, at 308 (internal quotations omit-
ted).  U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, at 282  (2007), 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf (indicating 
that in Brazil in 2004, the share of income or consumption by the poorest 20% was 2.8% 
while the share for the richest 20% was 61.1% and that Brazil’s Gini index was fifty-seven); 
see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 141. de Sousa, Participatory Budgeting, supra note 135, at 310. 
 142. Id. at 311. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 312-13. 
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have no formal legal recognition.”146  This was because, since 1989, the 
Worker’s Party has controlled the Mayor’s Office, but not the city’s Cham-
ber of Deputies.  Legally, the Executive (the mayor) is entitled only to 
submit the budget to the city legislature, which can be changed or modified 
as the legislature sees fit. 
In political terms, however, because the executive’s [budget] proposal is 
sanctioned by the institutions of the participatory budget and thus by the 
citizens and community organizations and associations that participate in 
them, the executive’s proposal becomes a fait accompli for the legislative 
body in view of the political risks for the deputies in voting against the 
‘will of the citizens and the communities.’147 
In other words, representative democracy bows to the larger, participa-
tory expression of democratic will. 
The participatory budget as first implemented in Porto Alegre was based 
on three principles: (1) all citizens are entitled to participate as citizens, and 
community organizations have no special standing (in other words, no 
greater standing than any individual); (2) participation is governed by a 
combination of direct and democratic governance rules, and internal rules 
of functioning are decided by participants; and (3) investment priorities and 
resource allocation follow both “general” and “technical criteria,” where 
“general criteria” are substantive criteria decided by the participatory insti-
tutions and “technical criteria” look to questions of technical or economic 
viability with reference to federal, state or local legal norms.148 
There are three basic sets of institutions involved in the execution of the 
participatory budget.  First, there are several municipal institutions, the two 
most important of which are the Planning Office and the Office for Coordi-
nating Relations with Communities.  These offices manage the debate with 
citizens over the participatory budget.149  Second, community organizations 
independent of municipal government, somewhat similar to neighborhood 
planning associations in the United States, “mediate between citizen par-
ticipation and the choice of priorities for city regions.”150  The third set of 
institutions responsible for advancing the participatory budget process are 
“designed to establish a permanent mediation and interaction between the 
first two kinds. They are regularly functioning institutions of community 
participation,” notably the Counsel of Participatory Budgeting (“COP” in 
 
 146. Id. at 313. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 314. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 316. 
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its Portuguese acronym).151  The COP and a Forum of Delegates are then 
charged to pursue the “main goal” of the participatory budget, which “is to 
encourage a dynamics [sic] and establish a sustained mechanism for joint 
management of public resources through shared decisions on the allocation 
of budgetary funds and for governmental accountability concerning the ef-
fective implementation of such decisions.”152  A thorough description of 
the highly articulated structure through which the Forum of Delegates and 
the COP operate is beyond the scope of this Article.  In brief, however, it 
merits explaining only that both entities subsequently work in the sixteen 
different regions into which the city was divided for execution of the 
budget.153  Within those regions—and sometimes in micro-regions within 
them, as determined by citizen participants—there are several rounds of 
plenary assemblies to consider and identify budgeting priorities.154  Since 
1994, there have been six thematic areas.155  For purposes of this paper, the 
two most notable such thematic areas are Health and Social Welfare and 
City Organization, Urban, and Environmental Development.156  Moreover, 
these plenaries do not occur without extensive citizens’ preparatory meet-
ings, the aim of which “is to collect the demands and claims of individual 
citizens, grassroots movements, and community institutions, concerning 
regional or thematic issues; they also initiate community mobilization to 
select regional delegates.”157 
This is not the tidiest of democratic processes, and its structure has 
evolved over time.  For example, there has been regular modification of 
criteria for delegate selection to the regional forums.158  The important 
thing to note is that the changes were made by broad, participatory 
choice—to repeat: this is democracy emerging from below, and not im-
posed from above.  In this way, the participatory budget seeks to avoid 
some of the “deliberative challenges”—and specifically the hijacking of 
popular desires for established interests—that occurs in some efforts to 
give voice to grassroots concerns.159 
The aim, ultimately, is to identify the three budget priorities for which 
there is consensus.  A process of deliberation in the regional councils, 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 318. 
 158. Id. at 319-20. 
 159. See, e.g., Cole & Foster, supra note 129, at 115-21. 
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which then gets turned back to the COP and other citizen-focused delibera-
tive assemblies, achieves this.  There is much back-and-forth throughout 
the process between citizens, the executive, and the elected representa-
tives.160  Throughout, “the executive plays a decisive role.”161  Finally, the 
expressions of public preference are translated into concrete budget items 
through a sophisticated system of grading and weighing preferences.  This, 
like so many details of the participatory budget, also changes constantly.162 
As the above description suggests, participatory budgeting is not a prob-
lem-free panacea.  Challenges include control over information flows;163 
concerns about the autonomy of the COP and other citizen-oriented or-
gans;164 inadequate representation of women, especially at the higher levels 
of budgetary decision making;165 worries about the entrenchment of the 
representatives of the popular assemblies;166 and tensions in “relations be-
tween popular participation and popular representation.”167  A recurrent 
challenge concerns the fact that such a participatory democratic model in a 
representative system effectively creates “a model of co-government, that 
is to say, a model for sharing political power by means of a network of de-
mocratic institutions geared to reaching decisions by deliberation, consen-
sus, and compromise.”168  This can be unwieldy and requires constant 
oversight and re-thinking.169 
Nonetheless, and despite these ongoing struggles, the process appears to 
have become more robust over time.  A remarkable feature of the participa-
tory budget as applied in Porto Alegre (and subsequently copied widely) is 
that, despite such conflicts and the growing sophistication of the metrics for 
measuring popular priorities, not to mention an increasingly complex op-
erational structure, the numbers of people involved in the process grew ex-
ponentially.170  This appears to have been possible only because it: 
seeks to articulate measures of participation, on the one hand, with meas-
ures of priority and recognized necessity, on the other.  The participation 
measure guarantees the democratic legitimacy of political decisions, 
 
 160. See de Sousa, Participatory Budgeting, supra note 135, at 320-23. 
 161. Id. at 322. 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 324-25. 
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 168. Id. at 343. 
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whilst the priority and necessity measure guarantees the fidelity, objectiv-
ity and transparency of the conversion of political decisions into distrib-
uted resources.171 
The process appears to have engendered strong fidelity to its achieve-
ments.  Indeed, although some members of the city legislature have advo-
cated legalizing the participatory budget.  This has not occurred because its 
participants value the autonomy made possible by the absence of govern-
ment regulation of the process.172 
The participatory principles described above could equally help refine 
and sharpen the nature of decisions made through the system of climate 
change governance.  As mentioned at the outset of this section, three stan-
dard goals of the participatory budget process would equally be served if 
this model were applied in the context of climate change governance. 
B. Promoting Citizen Participation in Distributive Justice Decisions 
This Article has emphasized that much of the world’s population is ef-
fectively disenfranchised and disconnected from the political and social de-
cision makers who affect their lives.173  Moreover, as clever critics of cli-
mate change resource allocation discussions have noted, the current 
justifications for distributive justice in the current climate change govern-
ance regime are not compelling.174  However, this might not be so if there 
were a real possibility for citizens to participate in distributive justice deci-
sions.  Were people to understand that decisions were being made that will 
affect how they use land and what environmental resources are available to 
them, they would likely engage in those decisions and illuminate justifica-
tions for resource distribution. 
Where we live, and what is available for all of us to stay alive, are of 
course questions that affect all of us.  These are the kinds of questions that 
would be implicated by participatory climate change governance.  Thus, it 
is likely that many, if not most, people would be animated by the prospect 
of engagement in such decisions, just as they have been in Porto Alegre 
and elsewhere by the opportunity to participate in resource allocations af-
fecting the quality of their urban lives.  Moreover, this opportunity for citi-
zen participation could help clarify some of the imperfect incentives de-
scribed by commentators like Posner and Sunstein—described above as the 
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developed/developing country log-jam of climate change negotiations.  
Citizen participation in an inclusive process like that achieved in Porto 
Alegre and elsewhere could provide a solution for some of the more intrac-
table climate change policy issues like the appropriate caps for developed 
and developing countries.  That is, were citizens involved in the process of 
making decisions currently performed by their elected or self-appointed 
representatives, the results might be surprising.  Citizens of a “developed” 
country might well, for instance, express a preference for a progressive 
carbon tax, or vigorous incentives for behaviors that seek to reduce indi-
vidual and corporate carbon footprints.175  Once again, the profusion of lo-
cal U.S. initiatives seeking to promote aggressive climate change action in 
the face of federal inaction suggests this might be true.176  Similarly, it is 
conceivable that the urban poor in a “developing” country might express a 
preference for a more restrained growth trajectory if they could first im-
plement a long-term adaptive management strategy to deal with the pro-
jected effects of climate change, or even accept the possibility of less in-
come in the short term in return for a gurantee of cleaner air because of, 
say, a limit on the number of coal burning utility plants.177 
C. Effectiveness of Decisions 
It is equally likely that decisions made with respect to climate change 
policy would be more effective if they were the product of participatory as 
well as representative decision-making, assuming effectiveness is judged 
by the implementation of decisions to change behaviors affecting climate 
change.  As many climate change analysts have noted, claims for compen-
sation, not to mention pleas for resource redistribution, are, to say the least, 
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controversial, particularly for interests in developed countries.178  The 
heaviest carbon emitters, and notably the United States, are reluctant to 
agree to cap-and-trade systems or a progressive carbon tax on the grounds 
that such mechanisms would be unfairly prejudicial to their interests.179  A 
participatory element in climate change governance could help re-direct 
that resistance inasmuch as it would force us to scrutinize with greater 
specificity the wide variety of carbon-emitting behaviors (where and by 
whom) in both developed and developing countries.  Thus, urban participa-
tion in climate change governance would uncover a much wider range of 
opinion about and desire to find solutions for climate change than is the 
case when the stage is occupied only by representative governments in 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations.180 
D. Participatory Democracy and the Accountability of Elected 
Representatives 
The participatory budgeting model described for use in climate change 
governance does not, as explained above, replace popular will for represen-
tative governance.181  On the contrary, as the discussion above outlined, it 
introduces a participatory voice into representative democracy, producing a 
new form of co-governance.182 
The advantages of that model as applied in the budgeting context would 
apply equally in the context of climate change.  That is, for instance, a par-
ticipatory role for the residents of cities would likely increase the account-
ability of governments.  For instance, imagine that, as a result of the par-
ticipatory budget process in a number of U.S. cities, the U.S. Conference 
on Mayors announced its preference for a fixed percentage to reduce cli-
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mate emissions by some number—X%—by year Y.  Were the official U.S. 
position on this question to diverge from this stance, surely it would not be 
sustainable as a political matter, having been endorsed by a broad spectrum 
of social interests.  Suppose similarly that representatives of residents of a 
group of Indian or Chinese cities were to articulate a comparable position, 
stating the desire to reduce health care costs for the treatment of respiratory 
illnesses by limiting the construction of coal-fired utility plants.  In this cir-
cumstance, it seems equally likely that the popular pressure would alter the 
official position of the “representative” government. 
To be sure, there are many niceties of a participatory model as applied to 
climate change governance that remain to be worked out.  While it worked 
in Porto Alegre, would it work in cities with lower levels of public educa-
tion and worse human development indicia?  How could it be constructed 
across cultures and political systems to ensure that the executive power 
does not steal the decision making powers of the population?  What is clear 
is that in climate change governance, a matter that affects the resolution of 
one of the greatest social, economic, and environmental threats facing us 
today, new thinking about the best means to effect climate change policy is 
essential.  As James Gustave Speth, the former administrator of the United 
Nations Development Program, recently observed: 
It is no accident that environmental crisis is gathering as social injustice is 
deepening and growing inequality is impairing democratic institutions.  
Each is the result of a system of political economy—today’s capitalism—
that is profoundly committed to profits and growth and profoundly indif-
ferent to nature and society . . . .  The best hope for change in America is 
a fusion of those concerned about the environment, social justice and 
strong democracy into one powerful progressive force.183 
Speth might have said that this is the best hope not noly for “America,” 
but also for the globe.  As this Article has endeavored to show, the nature 
and future prospects of the world’s mega-cities, without the possibility of a 
participatory role for their largely unheard residents, will only negatively 
compound the already severe consequences we face because of anthropo-
genic climate change.  Participatory climate change governance provides 
one way to create the kind of progressive fusion that we desperately need, 
in the United States and beyond its borders. 
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